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ABSTRACT  
Entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm are two of the fastest-growing fields in eco-
nomics and management. The two fields developed largely in isolation and are only now 
beginning to be brought together. We argue that each field has much to learn from the 
other and that combining them yields a better theory of the firm and a fuller understand-
ing of the nature and effects of entrepreneurship in the economy. Specifically, the 
Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment, combined with the Austrian ap-
proach to capital heterogeneity, leads to a number of unconventional insights about the 
nature, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm. The judgment perspective also 
shifts attention from the discovery or recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities to the 
exploitation of those opportunities through the acquisition, combination, and recombina-
tion of resources, adding to our understanding of the causes and consequences of entre-
preneurship. 
  
KEYWORDS: Entrepreneurship, theory of the firm, organizational economics, oppor-
tunities, judgment, capital heterogeneity, asset ownership.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic theory of the firm—also known as the economics of organization or organiza-
tional economics—is one of the fastest-growing areas of applied economics. In the manage-
ment literature the resource-based and knowledge-based views of the firm have come to domi-
nate the analysis of competitive advantage. Transaction cost economics, agency theory, 
mechanism design, the nexus-of-contracts approach, and the property-rights theory of the firm 
are now part of the standard discourse among students and practitioners studying firms and 
markets. In short, the economic and managerial analysis of the firm is a vibrant area of re-
search and application characterized by a diversity of competing theories and approach and a 
robust empirical literature.  
Of course, the “firm” has long been central to economics, in the theory of production and 
exchange and the analysis of industry structure. Introductory textbooks all contain a section on 
the “theory of the firm” containing the familiar equations and diagrams describing the firm’s 
production possibilities set, its cost and revenue curves, and equilibrium pricing and produc-
tion decisions. However, the theory of the firm as a legal entity⎯the literature on the exis-
tence, boundaries, and internal organization of the enterprise (Coase, 1937)—is, in the history 
of economics, a relatively recent development. Indeed, the economics of business organization 
emerged as a distinct field only in the 1970s with the pathbreaking contributions of Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), Hurwicz (1972), Marschak and Radner (1972), Williamson (1975, 1979), 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Jensen and Meckling (1976) Holmström (1979), and 
others. However, once economists recognized a need for a theory of economic organization, 
the theory of the firm in this Coasian sense became established as an important distinct re-
search field and as one of the theoretical and empirical success stories of economics. 
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More recently, another applied topic—the analysis of entrepreneurship—has seized the 
spotlight in economics. The last decade witnessed an explosion of university courses, faculty 
positions, research and educational centers, journals, publications, and grant funding dedicated 
to the study of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is increasingly seen as a key to technologi-
cal progress, and (therefore) an important part of the growth process (Aghion and Howitt, 
1992; Baumol, 1993; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Blau, 1987; Blanchflower, 2000).  
 Recognition of the entrepreneur’s importance predates even the Wealth of Nations (Cantil-
lon, 1755) and entrepreneurship has long been stressed by “heterodox” economists, notably 
Austrian (e.g., Mises, 1949; Hayek, 1968; Kirzner, 1973) and Schumpeterian (Futia, 1980; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, despite the appearance of two important papers nearly 
three decades ago (Lucas, 1978; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979), mainstream economists have 
only recently become interested in the entrepreneur. While it is widely recognized that formal 
modeling cannot do full justice to entrepreneurship, at least some aspects of entrepreneurship 
can be captured in the standard equilibrium framework. One issue that has received a lot of 
attention is the analysis of occupational choice under uncertainty (e.g., Holmes and Schmitz, 
1990) and its implications for a host of policy issues (e.g., the incentives of minority groups to 
become entrepreneurs, access to credit as an entry barrier, the relative contribution to innova-
tion of small and large firms, etc.). Some work has also considered issues of direct relevance 
to management research, such as entrepreneurial learning (e.g., Parker, 1996). Overall, entre-
preneurship is becoming more mainstream in economics (Parker [2005] provides an excellent 
overview).  
The situation in management is similar. Entrepreneurship has long been an established 
field in management studies, but research in this area has been substantially transformed in the 
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last decade, particularly in strategic management.1 While early research was mainly taken up 
with the management of small and family business, more recent research has drawn on in-
sights from the psychology, economics, and sociology to arrive at clearer and more general 
conceptualizations of the phenomenon, well-defined research questions, and accepted proce-
dures for analysis (see Shane [2002] for a compilation). Much early work on entrepreneurship 
(e.g., Schumpeter, 1911; Knight, 1921) was purely functional in the sense that entrepreneur-
ship was invoked as a necessary step to explaining other phenomena such as economic devel-
opment (Schumpeter) or the existence of the firm and profit (Knight). These approaches did 
not pay much attention to the (multi-level) antecedents of entrepreneurial activity (Bjørnskov 
and Foss, 2008). However, the management literature has concentrated on antecedents such as 
individual cognitive structures, heuristics and biases, network position, and much else. Be-
cause of this emphasis, the literature has been drawn to Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurship 
as “opportunity discovery” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  
The main purpose of this book is to show how the research literatures on the theory of the 
firm and r entrepreneurship can be brought together to form a better theory of the firm and a 
fuller understanding of the nature and economic effects of entrepreneurship, Baumol’s (1986: 
68) oft-cited quip that “[t]he theoretical firm is entrepreneurless—the Prince of Denmark has 
been expunged from the discussion of Hamlet” (Baumol, 1968: 68), still rings true, even if the 
meaning of the “theoretical firm” has changed in the meantime. However, questions about the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and the firm arise very naturally. Do entrepreneurs need 
business firms to carry out their function? Are business firms run by entrepreneurs, or rather 
by hired managers? How does firm organization (e.g., the allocation of use and income rights) 
                                                 
1 Evidence for the spread of entrepreneurial ideas to strategic management research includes the 2008 launch of 
the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, a sister journal to the highly prestigious Strategic Management Journal. 
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impact the prevalence and quality of entrepreneurial ideas? Can entrepreneurship be a property 
of a managerial team⎯or is it strictly an individual phenomenon?   
These questions concern the locus of entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurial action does 
not take place in a vacuum. Entrepreneurs, like other economic actors, must employ scarce 
means to achieve their objectives, must economize on these means, must evaluate trade-offs at 
the margin, and so on. Moreover, as both entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm deal with 
business ventures, new firm formation, new as well as sustained value creation, etc., it would 
be natural to expect very substantial cross-fertilization to take place. As we will argue, many 
important research questions with considerable practical relevance appear at the intersection of 
these two fields.  
 Our objective is to explain, in this context, why entrepreneurs choose certain ways and not 
others for organizing their activities. These are questions that are becoming increasingly perti-
nent, and, indeed, some of them are, to a limited extent, considered in the recent economics 
and management literature on entrepreneurship. Consider, for example, some of the founding 
contributions to the recent economics literature on occupational choice. Lucas’ (1978) general 
equilibrium model examines the matching of firms and entrepreneurial talent, essentially col-
lapsing entrepreneur, manager and owner, given that entrepreneurial talent is unequally dis-
tributed. He reaches the conclusion that there is a matching between the size of firms and en-
trepreneurial talent, the most able entrepreneurs running the largest firms. Thus, there is 
clearly an association between firm organization and entrepreneurship here. One may question 
whether making entrepreneurship a factor of production and conceptualizing it solely as a co-
ordinating function is really in the spirit of the classics of entrepreneurship (cf. Bianchi and 
Henreksson, 2005: 358), but, more to the point, it is unclear in Lucas’ treatment why entrepre-
neurs would need firms at all. Why can’t they perform their coordinating function simply by 
using contracts? Why is the governance structure of the firm required? A similar critique may 
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be directed at another classic treatment, namely that of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979): It is not 
clear why the firm is needed to share risks in the way envisaged by the authors. Per implica-
tion much of the subsequent research that is based on these two papers (and on Holmes and 
Schmitz, 1990) fails to address the issue of the locus of entrepreneurship in the proper com-
parative-institutional (Williamson, 1985) terms.  
Relatedly, most of the economics of entrepreneurship deals with entrepreneurship as start-
ups, and implicitly claims that entrepreneurship evaporates beyond the start-up phase. How-
ever, established firms may act in a highly entrepreneurial way, discovering and seizing new 
opportunities, for example, through mergers and acquisitions. Analytically, this involves the 
boundaries of the firm, one of the key issues in the Coasian theory of the firm. Or, established 
firms may wish to stimulate a kind of behavior inside their corporate hierarchies that can prop-
erly be called “entrepreneurial.” They may do by means of incentive pay (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1992) or other devices, such as “access” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This involves an-
other key issue in the Coasian theory of the firm, namely that of internal organization.  
Management scholars in organization, strategic management, international business, etc. 
have for a long time been drawing eclectically on the theory of the firm. For example, many 
issues of strategic management (e.g., vertical integration or diversification decisions) are now 
routinely framed as problems of efficient governance. And among the most cited scholars in 
the top business administration journals is Oliver Williamson, perhaps the best known flag-
bearer of the modern theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996). However, if we turn 
our attention to recent management literature on entrepreneurship, we see little on the locus of 
entrepreneurship, though two of the architects of the recent reorientation of entrepreneurship 
studies clearly identify this as a key research issue (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
In short, while there is no obvious reason for a strong separation between entrepreneurship 
and the theory of the firm, these two literatures have not yet exploited the potential gains from 
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trade. There is a certain historical irony in this separation because one of the key early contri-
butions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship, Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit (1921), is also the first contribution to raise some of those fundamental questions about 
the existence and scope of the firm that contemporary economists view as the foundational 
questions of the theory of the firm. However, both the theory of the firm and the theory of en-
trepreneurship historically developed in such a way that the original Knightian program of 
providing a unified treatment to the firm and the entrepreneur has not been furthered. Our ba-
sic aim is to revitalize this Knightian program. In the remaining part of this paper, we further 
detail the need for such an integrated undertaking, describe some of the historical and discipli-
nary reasons why it hasn’t yet happened, and provide a summary of our positive argument.  
WHY THE FIELDS NEED TO BE BROUGHT INTO CONTACT 
The theory of entrepreneurship and the economic theory of the firm have much to learn from 
each other. A good theory of entrepreneurship should explain the conditions under which en-
trepreneurship takes place, the manner in which entrepreneurship is manifested, and the inter-
action between entrepreneurial activity and the firm, industry, and environmental characteris-
tics. In the contemporary entrepreneurship literature, entrepreneurship is typically seen as a 
theory of firm creation; once created, however, the firm ceases to be “entrepreneurial” and is 
explained by the conventional, neoclassical theory of the firm. But the process of firm forma-
tion, growth, and ongoing operation is a continuous one, and the factors that are relevant at the 
early stages do not disappear overnight. For this reason, a holistic view of the entrepreneurial 
process requires an understanding of the managerial and organizational aspects of the entre-
preneurial function. Similarly, the economic theory of the firm can be improved substantially 
by taking seriously the entrepreneurial aspects of firm organization and strategy.  
Advancing the Theory of Entrepreneurship 
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Entrepreneurship has been defined as innovation, alertness, uncertainty-bearing, adapta-
tion, creativity, and leadership. Chapter 2 surveys these various theories and definitions and 
argues that one particular approach, the Knightian conception of entrepreneurship as judg-
mental decision-making, provides an explanation of the entrepreneurial function that can be 
smoothly integrated with the economic literature on the firm. While the dominant approach in 
entrepreneurship studies focuses on the identification or discovery of profit opportunities, less 
attention is paid to the means by which such opportunities are exploited. The former focuses 
on the cognitive and behavioral characteristics of individuals who establish new enterprises; 
the latter focuses on the resources and capabilities necessary to transform opportunities into 
realized profits. Analyzing the resources used by entrepreneurs, both for the establishment of 
new ventures and the operation of existing ventures, sheds important light on the manner in 
which opportunities are transformed into value-creating activities. 
 More generally, entrepreneurship scholars in management are beginning to realize that en-
trepreneurship is closely linked to central issues of firm organization and strategy, and not just 
to the particular management problems of small businesses.2 Thus, in an influential and pro-
grammatic statement, Shane and Venkataraman (2000: 218) argued that management scholars 
in strategy and organization are fundamentally concerned with three sets of research questions, 
namely why, when and how 1) entrepreneurial opportunities arise; 2) certain individuals and 
firms and not others discover and exploit opportunities, and 3) different modes of action are 
used to exploit those opportunities. These issues include the issue of “how the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities are organized in the economy” (p. 224).  
                                                 
2 It is perhaps telling that one of the key entrepreneurship journals is (still) called Small Business Economics. 
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A key point in the following is that all three questions relate closely to fundamental issues 
in the economic theory of the firm.3 Since Coase (1937) these have conventionally been taken 
to be the issue of why firms exist (when non-firm, contractual means of allocating resources 
are available), what determines their boundaries (i.e., the allocation of productive activities 
across firms), and the determinants of their internal organization (i.e., organizational structure, 
reward systems, etc.). Thus, entrepreneurial opportunities may be directly tied to why firms 
exist, because firms may be formed to exploit opportunities, and the allocation of ownership 
and property rights in firms may influence opportunity discovery within and across firms.  
At the time they wrote their paper, Shane and Venkataraman could cite little work moving 
the field forward along these lines. Nearly a decade later the situation is little different, though 
the need for integration is increasingly realized. This is unfortunate because questions about 
the locus of entrepreneurship remain central to the analysis of entrepreneurship and its causes 
and effects. 
Advancing the Theory of the Firm 
The theory of the firm⎯here taken to mean agency theory (Holmström, 1979), property 
rights theory á la Grossman-Hart-Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), 
and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996)⎯has often been criticized for 
its static nature (Boudreaux, 1989; Langlois, 1992; Furubotn, 2001). While there are impor-
tant, subtle differences between these theories (Foss, 1993; Gibbons, 2005), for instance con-
cerning the role of unanticipated contingencies and process features (e.g., the “fundamental 
transformation” in Williamson, 1985), these approaches share a largely static and “closed” 
ontology, in that they focus on solutions to given optimization problems, avoiding questions 
about the origin of the problem at hand, or indeed of the firm itself. They build on the assump-
                                                 
3 Shane and Venkataraman (2000) only hinted at this; however, the link to the traditional issues in the theory of 
the firm has been more fully recognized since their paper emerged (e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2004).  
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tion of a given means-ends framework, a framework criticized by writers on entrepreneurship 
(Kirzner, 1973). A strict insistence on the features often associated with entrepreneurship, such 
as process, genuine uncertainty, ignorance, complexity, etc., is difficult to reconcile with es-
tablished theories of the firm.  
However, one can offer more pragmatic critiques of the static approach of the contempo-
rary theory of the firm that do not imply a fundamental rejection of the theory. Agency theory, 
for example, has generated important insights on the effects of incentives on effort and the 
relationship between incentive pay and risk. In explaining how a principal gets an agent to do 
something, however, the theory overlooks the more fundamental question of what the princi-
pal should want the agent to do, or indeed, how the principal got to be a principal in the first 
place. But it may be possible to tell an economics-based story about how and why the princi-
pal ended up as principal rather than agent (Foss, Foss, and Klein, 2007). Likewise, one could 
accept the basic Coasian explanation for firm boundaries (based on minimization of transac-
tion cost) while adding behavioral, experimental, or cognitive elements to broaden the scope 
and applicability of the theory (Foss and Klein, 2008). 
The Broader Management Context 
Our approach also has implications for firm strategy, particularly in context of the re-
source-based approach to the firm. In our perspective entrepreneurship is not simply another 
resource, like physical and financial capital, reputation, human capital, technical know-how, 
and the like, but a higher-level, coordinating factor—the source of what we shall later call 
“primary” or “original” judgment. In this sense, the basic explanation for systematic differ-
ences in firm-level performance is that entrepreneurs differ in their abilities to exercise origi-
nal judgment and to delegate “derived judgment” to subordinates. Here our approach comple-
ments the conventional resource-based literature, which focuses on the returns to individual 
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factors but neglects the returns to the firm, i.e., the idiosyncratic combinations of factors se-
lected by particular entrepreneurs (cite). The ability to organize resources is itself a capability, 
an ability to create and recognize strategic opportunities in the language of Denrell, Fang, and 
Winter (2003).  
While firms may “empower” employees partly because employees increasingly demand a 
certain level of autonomy, and partly because leaving decision rights with better informed em-
ployees may make much economic sense, empowerment, delegation, etc. are arguably also 
undertaken in order to stimulate initiative in a way that is best called “entrepreneurial.” Such 
localized entrepreneurial efforts may contribute to the many process improvements that to-
gether add up to the “learning curve” phenomenon (Zangwill and Kantor, 1998), may lead to 
interaction with outside parties who control potentially important knowledge (Foss, Laursen 
and Pedersen., 2007), can assist in product improvements, and may in some cases lead to im-
portant breakthrough innovations. Thus, the exercise of entrepreneurship inside corporate hi-
erarchies can have important implications for competitive performance.  
WHY THERE IS NOT (YET) AN ENTREPRENEURIAL  
THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Bringing entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm together requires us to convince scholars 
in both fields that there are significant gains from trade. For historical reasons (among other 
reasons) this recognition has been slow to emerge. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that 
economics, and with it the economic theory of the firm, developed throughout the twentieth 
century in a particular way, a way that effectively excluded a concern with the entrepreneur. 
However, entrepreneurship research shares some of the blame, as it largely ignored problems 
of economic organization, as explained below and in chapter 2. . 
The Theory of the Firm Literature 
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As mentioned, within the last few decades, the theory of the firm has become one of the 
fastest growing areas in applied microeconomics, and has had significant ramifications for 
management research. However, it has not been at all influential in entrepreneurship research 
in management (although it has not been entirely neglected either, cf. Jones and Butler, 1992; 
Mosakowski, 1998; Alvarez and Barney, 2005). The lack of contact between two fields that 
seem to overlap so naturally results partly from the development of economic thought.  
Although the economics of entrepreneurship dates back to Cantillon (1755), and important 
later contributions have been made by Schumpeter (1911), Knight (1921), Kirzner (1973), 
and, more recently, Lucas (1978), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Holmes and Schmitz (1990), 
Baumol (1993), Lazear (2004), and others, entrepreneurship has been notoriously difficult to 
integrate with the mainstream of economics. A case can be made that the mainstream of eco-
nomics works with very watered-down conceptualizations of the phenomenon and is therefore 
still fundamentally “entrepreneurless” (Bianchi and Henreksson, 2005). Whatever that may be, 
entrepreneurship captures interest among economists primarily because it is seen as an essen-
tial component of the process of economic growth and change (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Baumol, 1993), in itself one of the hottest research areas in economics over the last two dec-
ades (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).  
The economic theory of the firm emerged and took shape as the entrepreneur was being 
banished from microeconomic analysis, first in the 1930s when the firm was subsumed into 
neoclassical price theory (O’Brien, 1984), and then in the 1980s as the theory of the firm was 
reformulated in the language of game theory and the economics of information (e.g., Holm-
ström, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1986). The gradual “hardening” of the neoclassical approach 
in economics, including the mainstream approach to the theory of the firm, left, little room for 
the entrepreneurship; Baumol (1993: 17) calls it “the specter which haunts economic models.” 
Indeed, the terms “entrepreneur” and “entrepreneurship” do not even appear in the indexes of 
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leading texts on the economics of organization and management such as Brickley, Smith, and 
Zimmerman (2004) or Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer (2004).4  
In modern contributions to the theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995) reference to entrepreneurship is passing at best. As we sug-
gested earlier, this does not mean that crucial insights of the economic theory of the firm are 
somehow irrelevant or cannot be integrated with ideas on entrepreneurship; in fact, we argue 
that the exact opposite is the case. However, the specific form in which the economic theory of 
firm is nowadays increasingly cast may be difficult to align with entrepreneurship. For exam-
ple, a dominant paradigm in the economic theory of contracts is that of complete contracting 
which effectively rules out the possibility of unanticipated contingencies and fundamental 
uncertainty in contractual relations. While this does not necessarily rule out an economic treat-
ment of aspects of entrepreneurship (e.g., Barzel, 1987), it flies in the face of the fundamental 
idea that entrepreneurship is exercising judgment about essentially new resource uses.  
The neglect of entrepreneurship in the theory of the firm has much to do with fundamental 
heuristics for formal modeling. Theorists of the firm, like most other model-builders in main-
stream economics, consistently adopt an “on-off” approach in which, for example, agents are 
either fully informed about some variable or not informed at all, property rights are either per-
fectly enforced or not enforced at all, actions are either fully verifiable or not verifiable at all, 
etc. Thus, as a matter of modeling convention extreme values are chosen for many choice 
variables, because some (usually unspecified) information and/or transaction costs are sup-
posed to prohibit agents from choosing certain actions. Of course, theorists do this in order to 
be able to isolate the working of a certain mechanism; for example, how exactly ownership 
                                                 
4 Two British surveys of economics principles textbooks (Kent, 1989; Kent and Rushing, 1999) confirm a similar 
absence of the concept. A review of graduate textbooks used in Sweden (largely the same books used in the US 
and elsewhere (Johansson, 2004) confirms the absence of the concept of the entrepreneur. 
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affects investment incentives when it is impossible to contract over investments. The insight 
derived under extreme conditions may yield insights in investment incentives under less ex-
treme conditions.  
It is, however, possible to criticize the specific approach to developing theory followed in 
the theory of the firm, and to argue that it tends to exclude entrepreneurship. One critique is 
that the particular isolations performed in theorizing mean that a number of margins that 
would be relevant to real-world decision-makers are suppressed, and agents are not allowed to 
exercise entrepreneurship to somehow circumvent the interaction problems caused by the sup-
pression of margins. Writing from such a perspective, Furubotn (2003: 75) argues that if we 
are to take bounded rationality, a key assumption in certain parts of the theory of the firm 
(Williamson, 1996) seriously, then this has profound implications for theorizing:  
[G]iven the constraints affecting the availability of information and human 
cognitive capacity, each decision-maker has only partial understanding of the 
options extant in society and it is no longer possible to assume that each person 
knows everything about current technological alternatives, the nature and avail-
ability of all productive resources, the existence of and true properties of every 
commodity in the system, etc. 
In other words, we cannot portray the relevant decision problems as combining inputs 
known to everyone in the production of outputs known to everyone in a transaction cost mini-
mizing manner. As decision-makers are only aware of, or least knowledgeable about, a small 
subset of the many possible input combinations and cannot perfectly foresee future prefer-
ences, “… the individual guiding the … firm policies has to make hard decisions and act as an 
entrepreneur rather than as a fully informed manager routinely implementing clear-cut mar-
ginal rules” (Furubotn, 2003: 75). Indeed, Furubotn argues that this logically implies that 
transaction costs cannot be the sole cause of governance and contractual choice and that over-
all profitability must enter as a determinant.  
Disconnecting Entrepreneurship and the Firm 
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A second reason for the lack of contact between the theory of the firm and the entrepre-
neurship literatures is that many entrepreneurship scholars have implicitly or explicitly disso-
ciated entrepreneurship and the firm. The entrepreneurial act is often conceived as an inde-
pendent, free-floating cognitive act, divorced from subsequent processes of exploiting the en-
trepreneurial insight by assembling resources and producing goods and services. .  
This comes through in the literature on the personal, psychological characteristics of indi-
viduals who become entrepreneurs (i.e., who start new businesses). It is common, particularly 
within the management literature, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, daring, imagi-
nation, or creativity (Begley and Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and 
Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Entrepreneurship, in 
this conception, is not a necessary component of all human decision-making, as stressed by, 
for example, Knight (1921) and Mises (1949), but a specialized activity that some individuals 
are particularly well equipped to perform. If these characteristics are the essence of entrepre-
neurship, then entrepreneurship has no obvious link to the theory of the firm; the relevant per-
sonal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract on the market by purchasing con-
sulting services, project management, and the like. In other words, the locus of entrepreneur-
ship fundamentally doesn’t matter. 
Schumpeter’s legacy has arguably also played an unfortunate role in separating the theory 
of entrepreneurship from the theory of economic organization. Schumpeter is without any 
doubt the best known economics contributor to the entrepreneurship field. He is certainly the 
entrepreneurship scholar that non-specialist economists or management scholars are likely to 
associate with the field (e.g., Nordhaus, 2004). However, Schumpeter not only explicitly dis-
sociated the firm and the entrepreneur; he also casted the latter in heroic terms as an almost 
genial Gründer, so that entrepreneurship tended to become an exceptional occurrence of mas-
sive importance; the entrepreneur is a person who by introducing “new combinations”— new 
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products, production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial combinations — 
shakes the economy out of its previous equilibrium, starting a process Schumpeter termed 
“creative destruction.” However, as we shall argue, entrepreneurship is usually something 
much more mundane, and, moreover, something that is closely tied to firm organization. In 
contrast, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur need not own capital, or even work within the confines of 
a business firm at all. This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and 
the firm he owns, works for, or contracts with. Moreover, because Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurship is sui generis, independent of its environment, the nature and structure of the firm 
does not affect the level of entrepreneurship.  
Entrepreneurship can also be conceived as “alertness” to profit opportunities, a notion usu-
ally associated with the work of Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992) which is probably only 
overshadowed by Schumpeter’s in terms of its impact on social science research. In particular, 
Kirzner’s work has become increasingly prominent in management work on entrepreneurship, 
directly inspiring the tendency in the field to move away from a conception of entrepreneur-
ship as centered on small-business management to a conception of entrepreneurship as a gen-
eral phenomenon, centering on opportunity discovery (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Shane, 
2003). As we shall discuss in greater detail later, there is something paradoxical about the fas-
cination of management scholars with Kirzner’s work, for Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own 
capital, they need only be alert to profit opportunities. Because they own no assets, they bear 
no uncertainty. For this reason, the link between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the theory of 
the firm is weak. Owners, managers, employees, and independent contractors can all be alert 
to new profit opportunities; Kirzner’s entrepreneur does not need a firm to exercise his func-
tion in the economy. Kirzner is not interested in the antecedents of entrepreneurship other than 
profit opportunities; in fact, Kirzner is not interested in entrepreneurship for its own sake, but 
only as an equilibrating force. His is a purely functional concept. In contrast, the entrepreneur-
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ship literature in management tends to paint a much less anonymous portrait of the entrepre-
neurship and to explicitly associate entrepreneurship with firms.  
Other notions of entrepreneurship (e.g., entrepreneurship as charismatic leadership, Witt, 
1998) can similarly be shown to have been actively disconnected from the issue of the locus of 
entrepreneurship by their proponents. We provide a fuller discussion of these issues later. Suf-
fice it to be said here that the sole exception in the entrepreneurship literature is the notion of 
entrepreneurship as judgment, a notion put forward in the first economics contribution to en-
trepreneurship, Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature de commerce en géneral (1755). While 
the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is most often associated 
with Knight (1921). For Knight, firm organization, profit, and the entrepreneur are closely 
related. In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a result, and a cause, respectively, of com-
mercial experimentation (Demsetz, 1988). As signaled already, much of what we are up to in 
this work may be seen as a reinterpretation, restatement, refinement, and updating of Knight’s 
vision.  
Identifying and Exploiting Opportunities 
A third and perhaps more subtle reason for the disconnect between the two fields lies in a 
conceptualization of entrepreneurship—dominant in the economics as well as in the manage-
ment literature—in which the identification or imagination of profit opportunities is separated 
from the process of exploiting or realizing such opportunities. In fact, many contributors to the 
entrepreneurship literature put all the emphasis on the discovery of opportunities and suppress 
the exploitation aspects, neglecting the assembling of resources, learning about resource at-
tributes, putting conjectures about resources to the test, etc. The process of resource deploy-
ment to seize opportunities is implicitly treated as the domain of established theories in strat-
egy, organizational behavior, the economics of organization, etc. rather than something that 
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belongs to the entrepreneurship field. For example, Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1985) thinks of en-
trepreneurial discovery as simultaneously discovering and seizing an opportunity. This may 
well fit Kirzner’s paradigm example—the discovery of a dollar bill lying on the sidewalk—
and it may be an innocuous assumption in the context of the purpose Kirzner’s theory of en-
trepreneurship: to explain the equilibrating market process. However, in general it miscon-
strues the nature of entrepreneurship, and disconnects entrepreneurship from the firm.
  
Likewise, management theories of economic organization and strategy, while paying sub-
stantial attention to the cognitive aspects of the discovery process (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; 
Shane, 2003), tend to treat opportunities as given once the process of assembling resources 
begins. In other words, established approaches both in entrepreneurship theory and in man-
agement treat opportunity discovery as a discrete event separating two distinct stages of the 
value creation process, giving rise to a separation into two sets of literatures, one on the proc-
esses by which plans are made, opportunities are perceived, etc., and another in which plans, 
once formulated, are executed through the deployment of resources.  
We argue that the separation of the value creation process into distinct discovery and ex-
ploitation phases is artificial and misleading. In our perspective, opportunities for entrepreneu-
rial gain do not exist, objectively, waiting to be discovered and exploited; rather, opportunities 
come into existence only as they are manifested in action. Of course, objective indications of 
an opportunity may exist, such as consumer research that reveals that consumers may demand 
certain not yet existing functionalities in certain products. However, such indicators do not 
automatically translate into opportunities, for two reasons. First, the objective indicators re-
quire interpretation; survey results may be objective data, but the knowledge embodied 
therein contains an essential subjective element (Foss, Klein, Kor, and Mahoney, 2007). Sec-
ond, unmet market demands, once perceived, do not become opportunities without substantial 
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commitment of resources on the part of the entrepreneur, including his own work. In other 
words, opportunities are largely created through forward-looking entrepreneurial action.  
This is essentially the concept of entrepreneurship as judgmental decision making under 
uncertainty, a concept we trace through Cantillon (1755), Say (1803), Knight (1921), and 
Mises (1949). In this approach entrepreneurs are modeled as decision-makers who invest re-
sources based on their expectations of future market conditions, investments that may or may 
not yield positive return. Here the focus is not on opportunities per se, but on investment and 
uncertainty. For these writers, opportunities do not exist, waiting to be discovered (and hence, 
by definition, exploited). Rather, entrepreneurs invest resources based on their expectations of 
future consumer demands and market conditions, investments that may or may not yield posi-
tive return. Here the focus is not on opportunities, but on investment and uncertainty. Expecta-
tions about the future are inherently subjective and, under conditions of uncertainty rather than 
risk, constitute judgments that are not themselves modelable. Put differently, subjectivism 
implies that opportunities are neither “discovered” nor “created” (Alvarez and Barney, 2007), 
but perceived. They may or may not exist, in an objective sense. Hence a research program 
based on formalizing and studying empirically the processes leading individuals to discover 
opportunities, whether based on economics or psychology, are misguided. Opportunities for 
entrepreneurial gain are thus inherently subjective, in the sense that they do not exist until 
profits are realized. Thus, the notion of “entrepreneurial opportunity” is in a sense an ex post 
concept. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OUR BASIC NARRATIVE 
The Centrality of Entrepreneurial Judgment 
To examine the relationship between entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm, it may be 
useful to survey and sift through the various approaches to entrepreneurship, asking to what 
 19
extent the entrepreneur needs a firm (a set of alienable assets he controls) to carry out his func-
tion. Based on such an exercise, we conclude that only the concept of entrepreneurship as 
judgment has a direct and natural link to the theory of the firm. Because markets for judgment 
are closed, the exercise of judgment requires starting a firm; moreover, judgment implies asset 
ownership. In Knight’s formulation, entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be as-
sessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight 
1921: 311). In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and 
therefore exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to own productive assets. Of 
course, judgmental decision makers can hire consultants, forecasters, technical experts, and so 
on. However, in doing so they are exercising their own entrepreneurial judgment. Judgment 
thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making is ultimately decision-making 
about the employment of resources.5
New Combinations of Heterogeneous Capital Assets 
Next, we review briefly the main themes in the modern theory of the firm (existence, 
boundaries, and internal organization) and show how the notion of entrepreneurship as judg-
ment illuminates these issues in novel ways. To develop a judgment-based approach to eco-
nomic organization, we also draw on ideas from Austrian economics (Mises 1949; Rothbard 
1962; Kirzner 1973)—the body of economics that is perhaps most intimately connected to 
ideas on entrepreneurship—and on property rights economics (Hart 1995; Barzel 1997), an 
important part of modern organizational economics. In our approach, resource uses are not 
data, but are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to produce goods. 
The entrepreneur’s decision problem is aggravated by the fact that capital assets are heteroge-
neous, and it is not immediately obvious how they should be combined.  
                                                 
5 Note that we define the firm here in terms of resource ownership, not the employment relation. A firm, in this 
sense, can consist of an individual resource owner—a craftsman who owns his own tools is a firm, while an iden-
tical craftsman who works with someone else’s tools is an employee.  
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The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the capital goods he owns. In the 
words of Ludwig Lachmann (1956: 16), a key contributor to the Austrian theory of capital: 
“We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations . . . will be ever 
changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the en-
trepreneur.” Austrian capital theory provides a unique foundation for an entrepreneurial theory 
of economic organization. Neoclassical production theory, with its notion of capital as a per-
manent, homogeneous fund of value, rather than a discrete stock of heterogeneous capital 
goods, is of little help here.6 Transaction cost, resource-based, and property-rights approaches 
to the firm do incorporate notions of heterogeneous assets, but they tend to invoke the needed 
specificities in an ad hoc fashion to rationalize particular trading problems—for transaction 
cost economics, asset specificity; for capabilities theories, tacit knowledge; and so on. The 
Austrian approach, starting with Menger’s (1871) concepts of higher- and lower-order goods 
and extending through Böhm-Bawerk’s (1889) notion of roundaboutness, Lachmann’s (1956) 
theory of multiple specificities, and Kirzner’s (1966) formulation of capital structure in terms 
of subjective entrepreneurial plans, offers a solid foundation for a judgment-based theory of 
entrepreneurial action. 
One way to operationalize the Austrian notion of heterogeneity is to incorporate Barzel’s 
(1997) idea that capital goods are distinguished by their attributes. Attributes are characteris-
tics, functions, or possible uses of assets, as perceived by an entrepreneur. Assets are hetero-
geneous to the extent that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attrib-
utes may also vary over time, even for a particular asset. Given Knightian uncertainty, entre-
preneurs are unlikely to know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are 
made. Nor can the future attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with 
                                                 
6 Ironically, the notion of capital as a homogeneous fund owes its popularity to Knight (1936). 
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certainty. Attributes are manifested in production decisions and realized only ex post, after 
profits and losses materialize.7  
Ownership, the Boundaries of the Firm, and Internal Organization  
Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital assets will want 
ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for reasons of econo-
mizing on transaction costs. These arguments provide room for entrepreneurship that goes 
beyond deploying a superior combination of capital assets with “given” attributes, acquiring 
the relevant assets, and deploying these to producing for a market: Entrepreneurship may also 
be a matter of experimenting with capital assets in an attempt to discover new valued attrib-
utes.  
Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations 
through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the form of trying out new com-
binations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s success in 
experimenting with assets in this manner depends not only on his ability to anticipate future 
prices and market conditions, but also on internal and external transaction costs, the entrepre-
neur’s control over the relevant assets, how much of the expected return from experimental 
activity he can hope to appropriate, and so on.  
IMPLICATIONS AND TAKEAWAYS 
A number of unconventional insights of relevance for the theory of the firm and the theory of 
entrepreneurship emerge from the approach sketched above.  
                                                 
7 As Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 793) note, “[e]fficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result 
not of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the relative productive performances of those 
resources.” Contra the production function view in basic neoclassical economics, such knowledge is not given, 
but has to be created or discovered. Even in the literature on opportunity creation and exploitation, in which en-
trepreneurial objectives are seen as emerging endogenously from project champions’ creative imaginations, en-
trepreneurial means (resources) are typically taken as given (see, for example, Sarasvathy, 2001). 
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Overcoming the Schumpeterian Bias in the Entrepreneurship Literature 
First, our approach suggests that the Schumpeterian model, while useful for understanding 
the nature and effects of disruptive technological change, does not constitute a general theory 
of entrepreneurship and its economic effects. Indeed, in our view the entrepreneurship field 
has been under a Schumperian spell. As mentioned above Schumpeter cast the entrepreneur in 
heroic terms, emphasized innovation, and argued that the entrepreneur ceased to be an entre-
preneur once he began putting his entrepreneurial vision into action.  
The judgment-based approach associated with Cantillon (1755), Say (1803), Knight 
(1921), and Mises (1949) is very different. These theorists all stressed that entrepreneurship is 
not a property that is reserved to a business elite, but is a general aspect of human action. This 
conception, rather than Schumpeter’s, animates the present work. It is one, we argue, that is 
not only more generally correct for purely scientific reasons. It is also better suited to the un-
derstanding of entrepreneurship as we see it unfolding in the economy, in the form of “churn-
ing” or in the attempts of many modern firms to encourage entrepreneurial behavior—what we 
shall call “proxy entrepreneurship—inside their corporate hierarchies.  
From Opportunity Discovery to Entrepreneurial Action 
The best-known approach to entrepreneurship within the management literature focuses on 
opportunity discovery or opportunity identification, or what Shane (2003) calls the “individ-
ual–opportunity nexus.” Opportunity identification involves not only technical skills like fi-
nancial analysis and market research, but also less tangible forms of creativity, team building, 
problem solving, and leadership (Long and McMullan, 1984; Hills, Lumpkin, and Singh, 
1997; Hindle, 2004). It can involve both the recognition of already existing opportunities and 
the creation, ex nihilo, of new opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). This conception 
makes opportunities, and their discovery and (potential) exploitation, the unit of analysis for 
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entrepreneurship research. A precise definition of opportunities, however, has been elusive 
(McMullen, Plummer, and Acs, 2007: 273). 
We argue that the unit of analysis should not be opportunities, but rather some action—in 
Knightian terms, the assembly of resources in the present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts 
in the future. In other ways, what should be emphasized are not the psychological aspects of 
“discovery,” but rather the processes by which entrepreneurial perceptions are translated into 
action.  
Entrepreneurship, then, is essentially a particular kind of investment behavior (more spe-
cifically, investment under Knightian uncertainty). This implies that the theory of entrepre-
neurship should focus on the assembly of resources, the creation or discovery of resource at-
tributes (i.e., the uses, functionalities, characteristics, etc. of resources), the processes by 
which agents learn about resource attributes, the impediments to and facilitators of such proc-
esses, and the interactions among resources.  
The Locus of Entrepreneurship 
In short, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, the locus of entre-
preneurship is the firm, where the firm is understood in the sense of ownership of alienable 
assets.8 We argue that the existence of the firm may be understood in terms of limits of the 
market for judgment, judgment about how heterogeneous assets may be combined to meet 
future wants. Second, we argue that the boundaries of the firm, as well as aspects of internal 
organization, may be understood as being responsive to entrepreneurial processes of experi-
mentation.  
                                                 
8 This is a conception of the firm that is based on property rights economics (Hart, 1995; Barzel, 1997) and is in 
line with the Coasian tradition in the theory of the firm (Coase, 1937). We later elaborate on this theory.  
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In the Knightian perspective, the effects of combining heterogeneous capital resources—
the value, in other words, of particular resource bundles—is not known to the entrepreneur 
prior to action. Given the uncertainty inherent in all human endeavors, the entrepreneur must 
experiment with various combinations, which suggests that the process of finding the “opti-
mal” boundary of a firm is not the result simply of a static optimization problem, but the com-
plex, path-dependent result of processes of creativity and discovery. Firm boundaries will be 
continually changing (though internal growth, acquisitions and divestitures, ownership 
changes, and the like), not due to exogenous shocks to a previously stable equilibrium, but due 
to the process of experimentation itself. 
Concerning internal organization, if entrepreneurship is judgment, then the firm can be 
conceived as a hierarchy of nested judgment. At the top of this hierarchy are the firm’s own-
ers, who exercise “original” judgment. They hold the ultimate decision rights over the use of 
the firm’s assets, and they hire employees to whom they delegate specified decision authority. 
These employees exercise “derived” judgment over the use of the owner’s assets. If the own-
ers are entrepreneurs, these employees act as “proxy-entrepreneurs,” exercising decision rights 
delegated to them by the firm’s owners. The behavior of proxy-entrepreneurs, we show, is not 
fixed, but is affected by economic organization and governance. In other words, proxy-
entrepreneurship can be fostered, channeled, manipulated by the firm’s organizational archi-
tecture. Moreover, proxy entrepreneurship is not simply discovery, but exploitation. For this 
reason, policies designed to promote creativity, experimentation, etc. among employees can be 
counterproductive if they fail to treat proxy entrepreneurship in an integrated, holistic fashion. 
For example, if proxy entrepreneurs do not bear the full wealth effects of their actions, they 
have an incentive to engage in moral hazard, devoting resources to the discovery of opportuni-
ties without proper regard to the costs of the discovery process.  
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Venture Capitalism 
Distinguishing between opportunity discovery and opportunity exploitation reminds us that 
the two do not always go hand-in-hand. Efforts to encourage the former do not necessarily 
encourage the latter. Generally, efficiency requires that entrepreneurs bear the full wealth ef-
fects of their actions. For this reason, efforts to promote experimentation, creativity, etc. 
within the firm (cites) encourages moral hazard unless rewards and punishments are symmet-
ric. Outside the firm, strong intellectual-property protection, incentives for discovery such as 
SBIR awards, and the like may encourage overspending on discovery. The potential waste of 
resources on “patent races” is a well-known example (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982; Wright, 
1983). 
By contrast, if the essence of entrepreneurship is the assembly of resources under uncer-
tainty, then the locus of entrepreneurship is not the generation of creative ideas, but the fund-
ing of projects. Financiers—venture capitalists, angel investors, banks, family members, even 
corporate shareholders—are entrepreneurs. Owners possess fundamental judgment rights that, 
by the nature of ownership, cannot be delegated, no matter how many proximate decision 
rights are delegated to subordinates. In this perspective even corporate shareholders are treated 
not as passive suppliers of capital, as they are treated both in neoclassical production theory 
and in contemporary entrepreneurship theory, but as critical decision makers.9
                                                 
9 Jensen (1989) famously distinguished “active” from “passive” investors. Active investors are those “who hold 
large equity or debt positions, sit on boards of directors, monitor and sometimes dismiss management, are in-
volved with the long-term strategic direction of the companies they invest in, and sometimes manage the compa-
nies themselves.” While not denying the importance of this distinction, Foss, Foss, and Klein (2007) argue that 
residual control rights make all resource owners “active,“ in the sense that they must exercise judgment over the 
use of their resources. In this approach, investors choose how “Jensen-active” they wish to be, which makes them 
“active” by definition. 
 Both Rothbard and Kirzner offer similar arguments. Writes Rothbard (1962: 538): “Hired managers may suc-
cessfully direct production or choose production processes. But the ultimate responsibility and control of produc-
tion rests inevitably with the owner, with the businessman whose property the product is until it is sold. It is the 
owners who make the decision concerning how much capital to invest and in what particular processes. And 
particularly, it is the owners who must choose the managers. The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their 
property and the choice of the men to manage it must therefore be made by the owners and by no one else.” 
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Some applications, such as the staging of venture finance (Gompers, 1995), are obvious. 
Another application is the inherent uncertainty of the gains from corporate takeovers. In the 
absence of uncertainty, one can imagine an equilibrium in which the number of takeovers is 
suboptimal because shareholders will refuse to tender their shares for anything less than their 
share of the post-takeover value of the firm (Scharfstein, 1988). In a world of Knightian uncer-
tainty, however, the post-takeover value of the firm is uncertain, and many shareholders, not 
wanting to bear this uncertainty, will tender their shares to the “raider” at a price above the 
pre-takeover share value but below the raider’s expected post-takeover price. The raider’s re-
turn to a successful takeover is thus a form of pure entrepreneurial profit (Klein, 1999: 36–38).  
Group Entrepreneurship 
Focusing on opportunity exploitation also responds to recent calls to link the theory of en-
trepreneurship more closely to the theory of group behavior (Stewart, 1989; Mosakowski, 
1998; Cook and Plunkett, 2006). Some efforts to develop a theory of team entrepreneurship 
focus on shared mental models, team cognition, and other aspects of the process of identifying 
opportunities. Penrose’s (1959) concept of the firm’s “subjective opportunity set” is an obvi-
ous link to judgment-based theories of entrepreneurship (Kor, Michael, and Mahoney, 2007).10 
Entrepreneurs can also form networks to share expectations of the potential returns to projects 
(Greve and Salaff, 2003; Parker, 2008). 
On the other hand, even if one views the perception of a (subjectively identified) opportu-
nity as an inherently individual act, the exploitation of opportunities can be a team or group 
                                                                                                                                                         
Kirzner (1973: 68) makes a similar point about alertness: it can never be fully delegated. “It is true that ‘alert-
ness” . . . may be hired; but one who hires an employee alert to possibilities of discovering knowledge has him-
self displayed alertness of a still higher order. . . . The entrepreneurial decision to hire is thus the ultimate hiring 
decision, responsible in the last resort for all factors that are directly or indirectly hired for his project.” Kirzner 
goes on to quote Knight (1921: 291): “What we call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting some one else to do the 
‘controlling.’” 
10 Spender (2006) argues that “Penrose’s model of managerial learning [is] an accessible instance of the episte-
mological approach proposed by Austrian economists such as Hayek, Kirzner, and Schumpeter.” 
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activity. Venture capital, later-stage private equity, and bank loans are often syndicated. Pub-
licly traded equity is diffusely held. Professional-services firms and closed-membership coop-
eratives represent jointly owned pools of risk capital. Moreover, the firm’s top management 
team—to whom key decision rights are delegated—can be regarded as a bundle of heteroge-
neous human resources, the interactions among which are critical to the firm’s performance 
(Foss, Klein, Kor, and Mahoney, 2007). 
This approach also suggests relationships between the theory of entrepreneurship and the 
theory of collective action (Olson, 1965; Hansmann, 1996). Once an entrepreneurial opportu-
nity has been perceived, the entrepreneur may need to assemble a team of investors and/or a 
management team, raising problems of internal governance. Shared objectives must be formu-
lated; different time horizons must be reconciled; free-riding must be mitigated; and so on. 
Cook and Plunkett (2006) and Chambers (2007) discuss how these problems are addressed 
within closed-membership, or “new-generation” cooperatives. Traditionally organized, open-
membership cooperatives suffer from what Cook (1995) calls “vaguely defined property 
rights.” Because their equity shares are not alienable assets that trade in secondary markets, 
traditional cooperatives suffer from a particular set of free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control, 
and influence costs problems.11  
In response, a new type of cooperative began to emerge in the 1990s. These new-
generation cooperatives required up-front equity investments (in traditional cooperatives, eq-
uity is generated ex post, through retained earnings), restricted patronage to member-investors, 
and allowed for limited transferability of investment and delivery rights.12 One of the key chal-
lenges in developing new-generation cooperatives is the establishment of a founding invest-
ment team with shared objectives and constraints and an effective governing board. According 
                                                 
11 See Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) and Cook and Chaddad (2004) for details.  
12 Cook, Klein, and Chambers (2005) document the emergence of a cluster of new-generation cooperatives in 
Renville County, Minnesota. 
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to project champions—those entrepreneurs who formulated the original vision of the organiza-
tion—the biggest obstacle they faced was convincing other farmer-investors, with whom they 
had close social ties, to invest (Chambers, 2007). In other words, the successful movement 
from opportunity identification to opportunity exploitation depended critically on transaction 
cost and collective action considerations, social capital, and reputation. Team entrepreneur-
ship, in the Knightian sense described above, is a subset of the general theory of economic 
organization.  
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